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I. INTRODUCTION
A decade has passed since the, Supreme, Court held in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.1 that a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate
contained in a securities exchange registration statement will be enforced with
respect to claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).2 Prior to Gilmer, every circuit'court of appeals to consider the issue,
except for one, had held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory
employment claims were unenforceable.3 These courts relied on a series of
Supreme Court decisions which consistently held that employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements had rights to litigate their statutory claims in
court, independent of the collective agreements' grievance and arbitration
procedures. 4 The Supreme Court, however, declared such precedents' "mistrust
of the arbitral process... undermined by our recent arbitration decisions."5 The
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1 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also Martin H.
Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath ofGilmer, 40 ST. LoUiS
U. L.J. 77, 78-83 (1996).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633 (1994).
3 See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated by
500 U.S. 930 (1991); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989);
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters
Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d
1544 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Univ. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.
1986). The sole authority holding a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a statutory
employment claim enforceable was the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Gilmer. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), affd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
4 McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 282 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974).
5 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n.5.
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recent decisions to which the Court referred enforced commercial pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.6 The Court followed its prior
commercial arbitration decisions and held that a pre-dispute agreement to
arbitrate was enforceable with respect to a claim under the ADEA.
Although Gilmer's holding was narrow, the Court spoke broadly of a strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration and made it clear that a party opposed to
arbitrating a statutory claim has a heavy burden to demonstrate that Congress
intended to preclude arbitration. 7 The strength of the Court's endorsement of
arbitration seemed to invite employers to mandate agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims as a condition of employment. As employers have taken the
Court up on its apparent invitation, the controversy over mandatory arbitration
has swirled. Scholarly commentary has divided over whether mandatory
arbitration is capable of protecting employee statutory rights. 8 Professor
6 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
7 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25-27. The full reach of Gilmer remains to be seen. The Fourth
Circuit read Gilmer as impliedly overruling Gardner-Denver and its progeny. See Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996). In Wright v. Universal
Maritime Services Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 76 (1998), the Supreme Court acknowledged, "there
is obviously some tension" between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, but chose not to resolve
it. Instead, the Court held that if a collective bargaining agreement can waive an employee's
right to litigate a statutory employment claim, such waiver must be "clear and unmistakable."
Id. at 80.
Another issue that the Court did not decide in Gilmer is how broadly to interpret the
Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion of "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 2000). All circuits that considered the issue, except the Ninth,
construed the exclusion narrowly, applying it only to employees who actually transport
goods or people in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc.,
167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999); McWilliams v. Logicon,
Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Public Storage Mgmt., Inc., 121 F.3d 215 (5th
Cir. 1997); O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110
F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit
interpreted the provision to exclude all employment contracts from the FAA. Craft v.
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court recently resolved
the split, siding with the majority view. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302
(2001).
8 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Robert N. Covington,
Employment Arbitration after Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United States?, 15
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to
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Covington has envisioned arbitration evolving into an American system of labor
courts.9 Professor Stone has condemned mandatory arbitration as the "yellow
dog contract of the 1990s."10
Many of the institutional players in employment arbitrations have attempted
to deal with the fallout. Arbitrator-appointing bodies such as JAMS, 11 the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), 12 and the Center for Public Resources
(CPR)13 have developed rules for employment arbitration in an effort to ensure
disputants of basic due process. A task force comprised of representatives of the
American Bar Association, National Employment Lawyers' Association
(NELA), AAA, National Academy of Arbitrators, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution has
developed a Due Process Protocol for the arbitration of statutory employment
claims.14 Although such private efforts are commendable, we cannot rely on
private bodies exclusively to deal with the fallout from Gilmer. For example, in
Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock 15 the agreement required employees
to arbitrate all claims in proceedings administered by JAMS. JAMS refused to
administer the case because the agreement also shortened the limitations period
for filing a claim and restricted the remedies that the arbitrator was authorized
to award. 16 Nevertheless, the court enforced the promise to arbitrate. 17
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); Susan A.
FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLoYEERTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 221 (1997);
Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Disputes,
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DEmv. U. L. REv. 1017 (1996).
9 See Covington, supra note 8.
10 Stone, supra note 8.
11 JAMS, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES, at
http://www.jamsadr.com/employment-arb.asp (visited Nov. 1, 2000).
12 AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, NATIONAL RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES, at http://www.adr.org/rules/employment/employment-rules.html (visited Oct. 16,
2000) [hereinafter AAA RULES].
13 CPR PROGRAM TO RESOLVE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, at http://www.cpradr.org/
empdispuarbitrat.htm (visited Oct. 15, 2000).
14 TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT
OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, reprinted in DIsp. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37-39,
available at http://www.adr.org/education/education/protocol.html.
15 Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997).
16 1d at 232 n.10.
17 Id. at 232-33.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Inevitably, lower courts have had to deal with the fallout from Gilmer.
Courts have had to police the fairness of employer-promulgated arbitration
systems.18 They have had to decide what effect, if any, an employee's agreement
to arbitrate statutory claims has on administrative enforcement agencies such as
the EEOC. 19 They have had to consider their appropriate roles in reviewing
arbitration awards in statutory employment cases.20
This article proposes a systematic approach to such Gilmer fallout issues.
Part II develops the approach. It details the criticisms of mandatory arbitration
and finds that these criticisms may also be leveled at arbitration undertaken
pursuant to voluntary post-dispute agreements. However, Part II finds a general
consensus that mandatory arbitration, which is to be policed carefully or
condemned, is qualitatively different from voluntary arbitration, which generally
is hailed. Part II suggests that a key difference between mandatory and voluntary
arbitration, from the perspective of public policy, is that only the former poses
a significant risk of allowing employers to contract out from under the coverage
of employment statutes. Part II also suggests that Gilmer fallout issues can best
be dealt with by asking the question, "Does the position taken in a given matter
amount to a contracting out of the obligation to comply with employment
statutes?"
Part III uses this systematic approach to analyze the most common due
process issues posed by mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate: neutrality
of the arbitral forum, discovery, limitations on remedies, shortened limitations
periods, the cost of the proceeding, and mutuality of the obligation to arbitrate.
Part IV employs the approach to resolve questions of the effect of mandatory
arbitration on enforcement agencies such as the EEOC. Part V employs the
approach to define the appropriate role of courts in reviewing arbitration awards.
Part VI concludes.
18 See generally Martin H. Malin, Policing Employer Promulgated Arbitration Systems,
I EMPLOYEE RTs. Q., Spring 2001, at 20.
19 Compare EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.granted,
121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), andEEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998)
(both holding that EEOC may not recover monetary relief for individuals who were subject
to pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate their statutory claims), with EEOC v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1999), and EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (both holding that relief available to EEOC is not affected by
employees' pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate).
20 See, e.g., Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11 th Cir. 2000);
Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2000); DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997).
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II. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE FALLOUT FROM GILMER
The fallout from Gilmer.-has focused almost exclusively on arbitration
mandated as a condition of employment. Lower courts dealing With the fallout
have gone out of their Way to note that their decisions are limited to pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate imposed by employers and do not encompass post-dispute
voluntary ad hoc agreements to arbitrate.21, The, EEOC opposes mandatory
arbitration, but endorses voluntary arbitration.22 Similarly, the National Academy
of Arbitrators' policy regarding arbitration of statutory employment claims
distinguishes between mandatory arbitration, which it opposes, and voluntary
arbitration, which it endorses.23 Most tellingly, irepresentatives of the plaintiffs'
employment bar, which has steadfastly opposed mandatory arbitration, have
distinguished it from voluntary arbitration. For example, the National Employee
Rights Institute (NERI) has issued a statement opposing pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate but supporting employers who offer voluntary arbitration as one
vehicle for resolving employment disputes.24 Similarly, Paul Tobias, an icon of
the plaintiffs' bar who founded NELA and NERI, stated the following at a
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools:
First, I want to discuss voluntary arbitration after a dispute arises. The
plaintiffs' bar favors giving employees the option of going to arbitration. We're
all for it. After a dispute arises, the parties can get together, decide to go to
AAA, and resolve the matter in arbitration. Arbitration is good for many cases.
The employer can't get summary judgment in arbitration. It's usually cheaper
and faster than court. The employee gets an absolute right to tell the story to a
neutral party. Sometimes employees prefer arbitration to court. Voluntary
arbitration-Yes! ... I'm here to talk about mandatory arbitration of statutory
claims set forth in the United States Code, passed by the Congress of the
United States, and on that subject matter-mandatory arbitration-No! No
question, no brainer-No!25
21 See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir.
1998); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Nelson v.
Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 760 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997).
2 2 EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a
Condition of Employment (1997), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7511 (July 7, 1997)
[hereinafter Mandatory Arbitration].
23 NAT'L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, STATEMENT OF THE NAA ON INDIVIDUAL
CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT (May 21, 1997), at http://www.naarb.org/guidelines.html.
24 See Nat'l Employee Rights Inst., NERI's Position on Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, I EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 263 (1997) [hereinafter NERI].
25 Paul Tobias, Remarks at the Proceedings of the 1997 Annual Meeting Association
of American Law Schools Sections on Employment Discrimination Law and Alternative
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Critics of mandatory arbitration have many powerful arguments. They decry
the private nature of arbitration. Privately appointed arbitrators, they urge, should
not be entrusted with interpreting and applying statutes that embody public
justice values.26 The arbitration proceeding itself and the resulting award are not
public, further undermining enforcement of the statutes at issue.27 The
privatizing of dispute resolution, they contend, undermines development of the
law through judicially determined precedents. 28
Critics express concern that the arbitral forum will be biased toward
employers. 29 They observe that employees are one-shot players while employers
are repeat players. This may produce overt or subtle unconscious bias toward the
only party who offers arbitrators the prospect of repeat business.30 Of particular
concern is the diminished likelihood that arbitrators, as opposed to juries, will
make large awards of compensatory and punitive damages. 31
Mandatory arbitration, critics contend, also provides for inadequate
discovery. Because employers generally control the information that employees
need to press their claims, the lack of adequate discovery is seen as a major
advantage to employers and a major impediment to successful prosecution of
meritorious claims.32 Furthermore, because mandatory arbitration provides
procedures that are less formal than those in litigation, it may not adequately
protect against subtle racial or ethnic bias infecting the decision-making.33
Dispute Resolution (Jan. 7, 1997), in I EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 269, 282-83
(1997).
26 See, e.g., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 22; Grodin, supra note 8, at 53; Stone,
supra note 8, at 1046-47.
27 See, e.g., Alleyne, supra note 8, at 429-3 1; Joseph D. Garrison, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Constitutes Little More Than a Waiver of a Worker's Rights, DisP. RESOL. J.,
Fall 1997, at 15, 18; Stone, supra note 8, at 1043.
2 8 See, e.g., NERI, supra note 24, at 265; Stone, supra note 8, at 1043.
29 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 8, at 1040.
30 See, e.g., Alleyne, supra note 8, at 426; Grodin, supra note 8, at 43-44; Stone, supra
note 8, at 1046 n.196.
31 See, e.g., Alleyne, supra note 8, at 430; Grodin, supra note 8, at 50, 52; Stone, supra
note 8, at 1047 n.197.
32 See e.g., Joseph D. Garrison, Discovery in Employment Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 15.
33 See Alleyne, supra note 8, at 428-29. But see Dennis 0. Lynch, Conceptualizing
Forum Selection as a "Public Good": A Response to Professor Stone, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1071, 1074 (1996) (suggesting that employees may find the formal atmosphere of a
courtroom intimidating, whereas "[a] skilled arbitrator can make the setting for the
employee's testimony more relaxed and less formal with everyone at a table together and
fewer objections interrupting the presentation of testimony.").
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The concerns raised with mandatory arbitration are also present in arbitration
pursuant to voluntary post-dispute agreements. The proceeding remains private,
with a decision that will not be precedential or develop the public law. The
proceeding remains informal and discovery remains limited. The employee
remains a one-shot user of the arbitrator's services while the employer remains
a potential repeat player. The'concerns raised by the critics of mandatory
arbitration are concerns with arbitration in general. The differences between
mandatory arbitration pursuant to pre-dispute agreements and voluntary
arbitration pursuant to post-dispute agreements is, at most, a matter of degree.34
Why then is the controversy limited to mandatory arbitration? '
The short answer is that a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate is a method of
settling the dispute.35 Although a few academics have cautioned against the rush
to settle,36 the rest of the world has embraced it. The short answer, however, is
not satisfactory. It does not tell us why a post-dispute settlement is different from
a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate. Indeed, the Gilmer Court analogized
mandatory arbitration to post-dispute settlement,37 and others have argued that
if we allow post-dispute agreements to arbitrate, there is no reason to disallow
pre-dispute agreements.38
The longer, more satisfactory, answer begins with an analysis of the different
nature of pre- and post-dispute agreements to arbitrate. Post-dispute agreements
to arbitrate carry with them a very strong presumption that they were arrived at
after arms length bargaining and a determination by each party that the
agreement is in its best interests. The same can rarely, if ever, be said of pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate. Although courts are developing precedent that
distinguishes between mandatory arbitration agreements supported by
consideration and those that are unenforceable, 39 the law is focused on the
presence of a bargained for exchange in legal form only, rather than in empirical
reality.
34 For example, Professor Grodin has suggested that the impact of post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate on the development of the law is likely to be less substantial than that
of mandatory arbitration. Grodin, supra note 8, at 29. Similarly, NERI suggests that in
negotiating a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate, an employee may use the threat of
litigation as leverage to ensure adequate discovery. NERI, supra note 24, at 264.
35 See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Laiv Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 728 (1999).
36 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
37 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
3 8 See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 8, at 1353-54 (1997).
3 9 See Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); Gibson
v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7ih Cir. 1997); Smith v. Chrysler Fin.
Corp., 101 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
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The empirical reality is that mandatory arbitration does not result from a
bargained for exchange. In some cases, such as Gilmer, it is impossible for the
parties to bargain. Gilmer was required to register with the New York Stock
Exchange to be able to perform his job. The New York Stock Exchange required
him to agree to arbitrate all claims against his employer as a condition of
registration. Thus, even if Gilmer's employer had wanted to waive the mandatory
arbitration agreement, it lacked the power to do so.
In other cases, where the arbitration requirement is not imposed by an
outside party, there is no real bargaining involved. When an employer tells an
incumbent employee, particularly a long-term employee, to agree to arbitrate all
future disputes or lose her job, the employee has absolutely no choice in the
matter. There is nothing for the employee to bargain. Nevertheless, courts have
enforced such agreements. 40 Job applicants and new hires may be thought to
have more choice than established employees. However, invariably the
agreement to arbitrate is presented in a systematic manner as part of the standard
boilerplate-a manner designed to preclude questioning, much less bargaining
over it.41 An employee or job applicant who even notices the arbitration
agreement is not likely to question it.
First, there is a problem of asymmetric information. The employee or job
applicant is unable to assess the likelihood that she may end up in litigation with
the employer. Indeed, if the employee believed that there was a significant
probability that the employer would violate her statutory rights, she likely would
look elsewhere for employment. The employer, on the other hand, can assess the
probability that some employees, although not necessarily the employee at issue,
will end up alleging that it violated the law. Thus, at the time of hire or
40 See, e.g., Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Gottlieb, 116 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir.
1997) (unpublished opinion, No. 95-56153, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15516 (9th Cir. June 25,
1997)) (holding that an at-will employee's agreement to mandatory arbitration under threat
of discharge was voluntary even though the employee needed the job); Flynn v. Aerchem,
Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (enforcing mandatory arbitration agreement
imposed on incumbent employee with threat of discharge); Kreimer v. Delta Faucet Co., No.
IP 99-C-1507 T/G, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9610 (S.D. Ind. June 2, 2000) (enforcing
mandatory arbitration agreement imposed on 20-year employee); Lang v. Burlington N. R.R.
Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993) (enforcing mandatory arbitration agreement
imposed on 16-year employee); cf Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (observing that successor employer imposed mandatory arbitration
agreement on employees of predecessor as a condition of hire). But see Standard Coffee
Serv. Co. v. Babin, 472 So.2d 124 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (pre-Gilmer decision voiding for
duress modification to employment contract mandating arbitration where employee's
agreement was obtained under threat of discharge).
41 See, e.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1997).
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application, the arbitration agreement has much more definite value to the
employer than to the employee or applicant.42
Second, even if the employee or applicant realizes the potential significance
of the agreement to arbitrate, concerns over signaling effects will inhibit
bargaining over it. Employees and applicants will fear that voicing a desire to
preserve the right to litigate will send a negative signal that may dampen the
employer's enthusiasm for the hiring.43
Thus, it is clear that, except perhaps in the case of highly paid executives
whose contracts are negotiated at arms length by each party's counsel, pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate are imposed unilaterally by employers. Indeed,
to the extent that the arbitration system is a collective good, the need for
uniformity requires that the system be imposed unilaterally by the employer with
no room for negotiation.44
Employers who impose mandatory arbitration on their employees must
believe that such arrangements work to their advantage. The stock market
appears to agree.45 Merely because mandatory arbitration advantages employers,
however, does not mean it necessarily disadvantages employees. A common
reason that employers cite for resorting to arbitration is to save money.
Businesses view arbitration as less expensive than litigation and they use it
outside the employment context as well. 46 Reduced costs do not have to be a
zero-sum game, but may produce advantages for employees as well as
employers. 47 Arbitration, as a faster, less expensive procedure, may enable
employees to bring claims that would not be litigated because of the cost of
going to court.48 Furthermore, as noted by Mr. Tobias, summary judgment
42 See Grodin, supra note 8, at 28-29.
43 See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protections in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 118-19,
151 (1997).
44 See Estreicher, supra note 8, at 1358-59.
45 See Steven E. Abraham & Paul B. Voos, The Ramifications of the Gilmer Decision
for Firm Profitability, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 341 (2000).
4 6 See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control: The Corporate
Embrace ofADR, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133 (1998); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice:
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 29, 31-32 (1998).
47 See Maltby, supra note 46, at 55.
48 See Roberto Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact
and Legacy, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1051, 1051-52 (1996). Employer advocates routinely
make this point. See, e.g., Catherine Hagen, Remarks at the Proceedings of the 1997 Annual
Meeting Association of American Law Schools Sections on Employment Discrimination
Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Jan. 7, 1997), in I EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 269, 278 (1997); Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnstone, Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements Are an Effective Alternative to Employment Litigation, DIsP. RESOL. J., Fall
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generally is not available in arbitration.49 Yet, summary judgment is a substantial
impediment to employees litigating statutory claims.50 Moreover, the quicker
results that may be available in arbitration can increase the likelihood that
reinstatement will be a workable remedy for wrongfully discharged employees. 51
Nevertheless, because they completely control the arbitration systems, there
is substantial reason to fear that employers will structure the systems to their
advantage at the expense of disputing employees. The most blatant example of
such action in the reported cases involves the arbitration system at issue in
Hooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips.52
Phillips, like all other Hooters employees, agreed, as a condition of
employment, to arbitrate all claims pursuant to the company's arbitration rules. 53
The rules required the employee to state the nature of her claim and the specific
acts or omissions on which the claim was based and to provide a list of witnesses
with a summary of the facts known to each. The rules imposed no similar
requirements on the employer. 54 The rules provided for each party to select one
arbitrator and for the party-appointed arbitrators to jointly select a third.
However, the rules restricted the third arbitrator to those on a list completely
controlled by Hooters.55 Furthermore, the rules allowed Hooters to seek summary
judgment, to record the hearing, and to sue to vacate the award if the arbitration
panel exceeded its authority, but it gave no similar rights to the employee.56
Lastly, the rules allowed the employer to amend them at any time without notice
to the employee and allowed the company, but not the employee, to cancel the
agreement to arbitrate by giving thirty days notice. 57
1997 at 19, 22. At least one plaintiff's lawyer has suggested that if many claims are diverted
to arbitration, the plaintiff's bar will make up in volume what it may loose because of lower
monetary awards in individual cases. Garrison, supra note 27, at 18.
49 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
50 See Maltby, supra note 46, at 46 (noting that in 1994, 60% of federal court
employment discrimination cases in which courts made definitive judgments were disposed
of by pre-trial motion and employers won 98% of these cases); see also Garrison, supra note
27, at 18 ("In arbitration, the plaintiff does not face lengthy and delaying motion practice by
the defendant.").
51 See FitzGibbon, supra note 8, at 247-55; see also Garrison, supra note 27, at 18
("[B]ecause arbitration awards generally cannot be reviewed, and are usually issued within
six months to one year of the time the claim is filed, if the plaintiff receives an award,
payment is virtually certain.").
52 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
53 Id. at 936.
54 Id. at 938.
55 1d. at 938-39.
56 ld. at 939.
57 Id.
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The ,court held that the agreement imposed on the company a duty to
establish a fair and impartial arbitration system. The court characterized the
system that Hooters established as "a sham system unworthy even of the name
of arbitration." 58 It concluded that Hooters had breached its duty and ordered the
agreement to arbitrate rescinded. 59
Arbitration systems need not be as one-sided as the Hooters system to
provide systematic advantages to employers at the expense of employees.
Reported cases involve employer-promulgated arbitration plans that set the time
period for filing for arbitration shorter than the limitations period for filing suit
under most employment statutes, 60 and that limit the remedies the arbitrator can
order, excluding remedies available in court.61 Employer drafted documents have
provided that an arbitration agreement contained in an employee handbook is
enforceable while the remainder of the handbook is not 62 and provided that the
employer gets the ultimate choice as to whether the employee's claim will be
heard in court or before an arbitrator.63 Other employer plans have placed severe
limitations on discovery or the length of the hearing and prohibit representation
by counsel.64
Of course many of these same limitations might be agreed to in a post-
dispute arbitration agreement. However, in such circumstances, they will have
truly been bargained for and will apply only to that one case. For example, it may
be a rational bargain for the parties to a particular dispute to agree to arbitrate
and to exclude certain remedies, such as reinstatement or punitive damages, from
the arbitrator's authority. Such an agreement like any other settlement, does not
implicate the employer's conduct vis-A-vis the rest of its workforce. The
employer still faces the threat of litigation and exposure to the full remedial force
of the employment statutes if it acts illegally toward its other employees. In
contrast an employer that unilaterally imposes on all of its employees an
arbitration system that restricts the arbitrator's remedial authority has contracted
its way out of a significant portion of the statutory regulatory scheme.
Employment statutes provide for punitive damages and attorney fees to deter
58 Id at 940.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997); Miller
v. Public Storage Mgmt., Inc., 121 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1997); Circuit City Stores, Inc., v.
Shelton, No. 1:99-ev-561, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7059 (W.D. Mich. May 16, 2000).
61 See, e.g., Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258 (lst Cir. 1998); Peacock, 110 F.3d at 222.
62 See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
63 See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
64 See George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and
Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177,
183-84 (1998).
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violations and to provide incentives for victims of employer violations to enforce
their rights. An employer that, through a mandatory arbitration system, has
contracted out of such remedies has removed itself from liability exposure that
plays a crucial role in the statutory remedial scheme. Similarly, the remedy of
reinstatement is provided not only to right a wrong to the individual plaintiff, but
also to effectuate that statutory scheme by proclaiming to the workforce as a
whole that illegal employer conduct will not succeed.65 An employer who
contracts out of such a remedy through its mandatory arbitration system contracts
out of a significant component of statutory compliance.
The dangers that employer promulgated mandatory arbitration systems pose
to statutory compliance are clearly demonstrated by the Hooters case. If Hooters
had been able to enforce its employees' promises to use the Hooters system,
employees would have brought their claims before biased arbitrators selected by
and accountable to Hooters and they would have been forced to give Hooters a
significant amount. of information about their claims and litigation strategies
while being left totally in the dark concerning Hooters' defenses. The decision
to record and transcribe the hearing would have been left entirely up to Hooters.
These rules were designed to ensure that Hooters won every case, regardless of
the merits of the claim. However, just in case a successful claimant might find
a hole in the system, Hooters retained the right to close the hole by amending the
rules without notice. If Hooters' mandatory arbitration system had been enforced,
Hooters effectively would never have had to worry about complying with any
employment statutes at all.66
Thus, from an employment policy perspective, the principal difference
between voluntary post-dispute agreements to arbitrate and mandatory pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate is that only the latter pose a risk of allowing an
employer to contract out of the need to comply with the underlying employment
statutes. Recognizing this difference provides a principled, systematic method
for dealing with the fallout from Gilmer. Courts must police employer
promulgated mandatory arbitration systems to ensure that they do not serve as
vehicles for contracting out of compliance with employment statutes. The
remainder of this article applies this approach to some common Gilmer fallout
issues.
65 See FitzGibbon, supra note 8, at 251-52; Martin H. Malin, Protecting the
Whistleblowerfrom Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 316-17 (1983).
66 The only compliance threat Hooters would have faced would have been the
possibility of suit by a government enforcement agency such as the EEOC or the Department
of Labor, depending on the statute at issue. These agencies, however, are able to litigate only
a tiny fraction of the cases brought to their attention. Indeed, a major reason for creating
private causes of action under most employment statutes is the inability of the enforcement
agencies to compel compliance alone.
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III. DUE PROCESS AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Cole v. Burns International. Security
Services67 contains one of the most extensive and scholarly discussions of the
minimum characteristics of an arbitration system necessary to provide an
employee with a forum in which to vindicate effectively a statutory claim. The
decision has received considerable attention not only for its thoroughness but
also because its author, Chief Judge Harry Edwards, is a leading scholar in
alternative dispute resolution and the law governing the workplace. 68 The court
held that the arbitration system must provide for neutral arbitrators, "more than
minimal discovery," a written award, and "all types of relief that would otherwise
be available in court."' 69 Moreover, the system must "not require employees to
pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrator's fees and expenses as a condition
of access to the arbitration forum."70 Courts have had to consider each of these
elements that Judge Edwards itemized as critical to a fair procedure. Courts also
have grappled with the degree of mutuality they will require of the arbitration
process. The systematic approach developed in Part II provides an effective
guide for resolving issues concerning each of these matters. 71
A. Neutrality of the Arbitral Forum
An employer who imposes on its employees an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims in a forum that is biased toward the employer effectively has
contracted out of the need to comply with the regulatory statutes. If the employer
violates the statutes, it can count on the biased decision-maker to bail it out.
Thus, there is uniform agreement that the arbitration forum must be neutral for
employees to be able to vindicate their statutory claims.
The Gilmer Court, in compelling arbitration, observed that the New York
Stock Exchange's arbitration rules provided for disclosure of background
information on arbitrators, peremptory challenges and recusal for cause, and
concluded that Gilmer had failed to show that these procedures were "inadequate
to guard against potential bias." 72 In Hooters, the court placed primary reliance
67 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
68 Prior to assuming the bench, Judge Edwards was a highly respected labor and
employment law professor at the University of Michigan and labor arbitrator.
69 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
70Id.
71 See supra pp. 593-600.
72 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1991).
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on the employer's control of the identity of the non-party appointed arbitrator in
denying enforcement to the employee's promise to arbitrate. 73
Courts have been quick to condemn the use of non-neutral forums to resolve
workplace disputes. For example, in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,74
employees, who were not union members but were in the bargaining unit that the
union represented, were required to pay the union a fee covering their
proportionate share of the costs of their representation. The union adopted a
procedure whereby fee-payers could challenge the calculation of their fees before
an arbitrator selected by the union.75 The Supreme Court approved arbitration
as an effective method of safeguarding the fee-payers' constitutional rights not
to be charged for expenditures on political and ideological activities unrelated to
collective bargaining, but held the union's procedure defective because the union
controlled selection of the arbitrator.76
In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.,77 the California Supreme Court denied
enforcement to an arbitration provision in an agreement between a promoter and
a musician who was a member of the American Federation of Musicians (AFM).
The agreement, a form contract provided by the AFM, provided for arbitration
of future disputes before the AFM. 78 The court held that the AFM could not be
a neutral arbitrator in a dispute in which one of its members was a party. 79 As a
remedy, the court remanded with instructions for the trial court to allow the
parties an opportunity to agree on a different arbitrator or, in the absence of such
an agreement, to appoint a neutral arbitrator.8 0 Although Graham did not appear
to involve an employment relationship, did not involve statutory claims and was
decided prior to Gilmer, the California Supreme Court has since indicated that
Graham will apply to post-Gilmer employment arbitrations. 81
Single party control over the appointment of the arbitrator is not
controversial. It is uniformly condemned.82 Far more problematic are concerns
raised by allegations of covert systematic bias.
73 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
74 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
75 Id. at 296.
76 Id. at 310.
77 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
78 Id. at 168.
79 Id. at 173-77.
80 Id. at 177.
81 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000).
The court in Graham relied on In re Cross and Brown Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (App. Div.
1957), an employment case in which the court refused to compel an employee to arbitrate
his case before the employer. Id.82 Nevertheless, one survey found that 15% of responding employers who had
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Most controversy concerning covert or systematic arbitral bias focuses on the
repeat player effect. These concerns derive from differences between labor
arbitration conducted pursuant to collective bargaining agreements and
employment arbitration conducted pursuant to employer-imposed arbitration
agreements. In labor arbitration, the union and employer jointly select the
arbitrator. Both the union and the employer are likely repeat players in the
arbitration system. Consequently, each balances the other, ensuring that the
arbitrator selected is not likely to be biased toward either party. If either party
perceives an arbitrator as favoring the other party, it will strike that arbitrator
from consideration for future appointments. Labor arbitrators realize that any
attempt to curry favor with one party will short circuit their careers. Experienced
arbitrators recognize that the only route to long-term success, known in the
practice as "acceptability," is to decide cases on their merits, fairly, impartially
and professionally. For example, Arnold Zack, a highly respected arbitrator, has
advised the following:
[A]n arbitrator should decide every case as if it is his last one.... If an
arbitrator is concerned with the parties' reactions to his rulings, he will not
survive. An arbitrator must adhere to his own reasoning and judgment and
establish his reputation on that.83
More than a decade before Gilmer, Professor Julius Getman questioned
whether the self-regulating aspects of labor arbitration could successfully be
imported to employment arbitration where the employer is the only party likely
to be a repeat player.84 This imbalance is one of the most commonly cited
criticisms of employment arbitration.
The degree, if any, to which the imbalance in repeat players may bias
employment arbitration systems is an empirical as well as theoretical issue.
Professor Lisa Bingham's work is the most thorough empirical research into the
repeat player effect in employment arbitration. Professor Bingham's first study
examined a sample of employment arbitrations conducted in 1992 under AAA's
employment arbitration systems unilaterally selected the arbitrator. Mei L. Bickner et al.,
Developments in Employment Arbitration, Disp. RuSOL. J., Jan. 1997 at 8, 80.
83 Arnold Zack, Decision-Making, in LABOR ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT: A
HANDBOOK 111, 113 (Christoper A. Barreca et al., eds. 1983). Indeed, in labor arbitration,
it is the mutual expectations of employer and union, rather than the individual desires of one
particular party, that provide the primary constraint on arbitral decision-making. See Martin
H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor
and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGs L.J.
1187, 1198-99 (1993).
84 Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration andDispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 916
(1979).
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Commercial Arbitration Rules. Employees in this sample tended to be highly
compensated managers and executives. Professor Bingham found that employees
had a higher win rate and recovered a larger percentage of the amounts they
demanded in cases they initiated than employers experienced in cases they
initiated. 85 The study found no pro-employer bias.8 6
A second study that Professor Bingham conducted focused on a sample of
cases conducted in 1993 and 1994 under AAA's Commercial Rules and its new
Employment Disputes Rules. 87 The study compared outcomes of employee
claims against employers who used arbitration once versus outcomes of claims
against employers who used arbitration more than once (Bingham's definition
of repeat players). She found that employees won with significantly less
frequency when they arbitrated against repeat player employers than when they
arbitrated against non-repeat players, and employees recovered a significantly
smaller percentage of the amounts they demanded against repeat players than
non-repeat players. 88
The 1993-1994 AAA Bingham study documented the existence of a repeat
player effect. However, it raised many questions concerning the causes of that
effect and its implications for employment arbitration policy. Professor Bingham
found that white collar plaintiffs won significantly more often and recovered a
significantly greater percentage of the amount demanded than blue collar or pink
collar plaintiffs. 89 White collar plaintiffs were also more likely to be arbitrating
under the Commercial Rules and under specific contracts and more likely to be
represented by counsel, whereas blue and pink collar plaintiffs were more likely
to arbitrate under the Employment Rules and under employee handbooks or
manuals and to be unrepresented. 90 Repeat player employers were found more
frequently to be arbitrating under employee handbooks and under the
Employment Rules. 91 Thus, it was not clear whether the repeat player effect
reflected arbitral bias or differences in resources of the employee plaintiffs. 92
85 Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes?
An Analysis ofActual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369, 376-78 (1995).
86 Id.
87 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMPLOYEE
RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
88 Id. at 208-12.
89 Id. at 213.
90 Id. at 212-14.
91 Id.
92 See id. at 212. Professor Bingham herself raised these and other possible
explanations for the results. Id. at 213.
[Vol. 16:3 20011
PRIVATIZING JUSTICE-BUT BY HOW MUCH?
Additionally, the study covered arbitration awards rendered prior to the
adoption of the Due Process Proto6ol. The effects, if any, of the Protocol must
be evaluated in future research. 93
A subsequent study by Professor Bingham examined a sample of awards
decided under AAA Employment Rules from 1993 through 1995.94 She again
found that employees lost with significantly greater frequency when arbitrating
against a repeat-player employer. 95 She also found that employees lost with
significantly greater frequency when arbitrating against an employer who was a
repeat player with the same arbitrator than when arbitrating against an employer
who had not previously used the arbitrator handling the claim.96 However, she
also found that these results correlated with the basis for the arbitration.97 Repeat
player employers were more likely to-be arbitrating under personnel manuals
than under individual employment contracts and white collar employees were
more likely to be arbitrating under individual contracts. 98 Indeed, Professor
Bingham also found that among arbitrations occurring pursuant to personnel
manuals, there was no repeat player effect.99 The case frequency, however, was
too low to enable her to apply standard statistical tests. Finally, it must be noted
that this study also was confined to cases decided before the Protocol was
adopted.100
Professor Bingham's studies are cause for concern about the possibility of
covert systematic bias due to the repeat player effect. .However, they are not
cause for uniform condemnation of employment arbitration as enabling
employers to contract out of the employment statutory regulatory schemes. The
repeat player effects that she found may reflect the greater resources available to
employees who arbitrated under individual contracts and were unlikely to
arbitrate against repeat player employers, compared to employees who arbitrated
under personnel manuals and were more likely to arbitrate against repeat players.
Professor Bingham's work also focused on cases decided before the Due Process
Protocol. The Protocol and other factors may provide self-regulatory measures
that will police against covert bias due to the presence of repeat player
employers.
93 See id at 214-15.
94 Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics
in Judicial Review of Employment Awards, 29 McGEoRGE L. Rsv. 223,232-37 (1998).




99 Id. at 239.
100 Id. at 223.
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Judge Edwards, among others, has suggested several sources of constraints
that will protect against systematic covert bias among employment arbitrators:
adherence to professional ethical standards, policing by the plaintiffs' bar, and
policing by arbitration-appointing agencies. 101 Courts should police employer
promulgated arbitration systems in ways that support each of these constraints
as protection against covert systematic bias.
Thus, courts should inquire whether the arbitration system requires that
arbitrators adhere to a recognized professional code of ethics that mandates
neutrality. Courts also should facilitate the development of the plaintiffs' bar as
an institutional repeat player balancing employer repeat players. The importance
of the plaintiffs' bar cannot be overstated. 10 2 In labor arbitration, small
employers are repeat players to a much lesser extent than the unions against
whom they arbitrate. Nevertheless, the lawyers for small employers are major
repeat players and balance the repeat player influence of the unions. Similarly,
in employment arbitration, although the individual employees will not be repeat
players, their lawyers will be and may balance the repeat player influence of
employers.
The impact of the plaintiffs' bar already has been felt in policing the fairness
of employer promulgated arbitration systems. As Professor Corrada has pointed
out, AAA and JAMS adopted policies to ensure that arbitrations they administer
meet minimal due process standards at a time that they were facing a NELA
threatened boycott of their services.10 3
A major service that NELA and other employee advocacy organizations can
provide is to collect information, including prior awards, on employment
arbitrators. These organizations can provide such information as a benefit to
members and, for a fee, provide it to nonmembers. To facilitate the establishment
of such institutional memory on the plaintiff side, courts should strike down any
provision in an employer's arbitration system that purports to prohibit employees
and their lawyers from disclosing information about the arbitration, including
copies of the award. Of course, courts should strike down any arbitration system
that denies employees their right to counsel.
To further facilitate the ability of counsel to offset any repeat player bias,
courts should require arbitrators to disclose all prior business with the parties and
their lawyers.' 04 Upon request, arbitrators should be required to furnish copies
101 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
102 See Lynch, supra note 33, at 1073 ("It is clear that a specialized bar that regularly
represents employees in the protection of statutory rights is critical to the fairness of a New
Private Law in the labor law field.").
103 Corrada, supra note 48, at 1068.
104 AAA Rules already require disclosure of prior business with a party or the party's
representative. AAA RULES, supra note 12, at R. 11 (b).
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of awards rendered in such prior cases.105 A major limitation of such disclosures
derives from when they are made, i.e., after the arbitrator has been selected.
Therefore, courts should scrutinize closely any arbitrator's decision following
such disclosures to deny a request for recusal.
Courts, however, cannot be relied on to do the lion's share of policing
against covert bias. They can provide standards governing arbitral selection
procedures and arbitral recusal. However, courts typically will get involved only
after an arbitrator has issued an award. Excessive reliance on judicial policing
would undermine the finality of arbitration awards and, thereby, undermine the
savings in time and expense that are the major advantages of arbitration.
Therefore, most policing in the early stages of anoarbitration must be performed
by the arbitrator-appointing agencies. These agencies have an incentive to police
carefully because if they fail to do so they could see an excessive number of
awards they administer judicially vacated. 106 The role of arbitration-appointing
agencies is extremely important and often overlooked as an area for judicial
policing. It is discussed later in this section.
It is quite likely that a combination of external constraints (policing by
courts, appointing agencies, and the plaintiffs' bar) and internal constraints
(adherence to codes of ethics and professional standards) will neutralize any
covert bias on liability issues that might otherwise be induced by the presence of
the employer as sole repeat player in employment arbitration. Employment
arbitrators who slant their liability findings toward one side or the other are likely
in properly policed systems to meet the same fate as labor arbitrators who do the
same. In one area, however, the repeat player effect is likely to affect the
outcomes in employment arbitrations.
Outlierjury awards in employment litigation make the headlines. Employers
notice them and react accordingly. 10 7 Unlike arbitrators, juries need not worry
about repeat business. Outlier arbitration awards also will gain notoriety.
Employers will notice and will ensure that the authors of those awards are not
105 When the AAA provides parties with a panel of arbitrators, it also provides, to the
extent possible, names of parties or their representatives in recent cases decided by the
arbitrators listed on that panel. Id.
106 See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 485, 490
(1997) (suggesting that where an early challenge is made to the arbitrator-appointing agency,
the agency will recognize that the preferred and more economical course of conduct is to
have the arbitrator step aside).
107 See JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR MARKET RESPONSES TO
EMPLOYER LIABILrrY (1992); JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION (1988).
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selected for future cases.108 Employer lawyers see the need to maintain future
acceptability as a significant brake on outlier arbitration damage awards.10 9
In labor arbitration, where the repeat players are balanced, monetary awards
are quite modest. 1 10 Consequential damages, punitive damages, and interest are
rarely awarded. I I Similarly, the limited empirical evidence available suggests
that monetary remedies in employment arbitration are likely to be considerably
lower than those awarded in litigation. 112
If employment arbitration leads to the death of outlier monetary awards,
should we mourn their passing? At first blush we might be tempted to conclude
that employers by contracting out of exposure to outlier monetary awards are
contracting out of a significant incentive for statutory compliance. Further
scrutiny, however, suggests that this is not necessarily the case.
Obsessions with outlier monetary awards distort the picture of typical actual
recoveries. Professor Clyde Summers, after analyzing data from studies of
wrongful discharge litigation in California, found that there was a large disparity
in recovery among litigants." 3 Even for litigants who received high jury verdicts,
post-trial appeals and settlements substantially reduced final payments, and
attorney contingency fees and reimbursement of litigation costs reduced the
employee's net recovery even further.114 Professor Summers found that most
wrongfully discharged employees received modest or inadequate awards, often
less than half their economic losses, and they had to wait three to five years after
their discharges for any recovery.11 5 He further found that the wide disparity in
108 See Maura Dolan, Courts Question Rules Baring Suits by Workers, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2000, at A-I (reporting that Los Angeles employment arbitrator Stefan Mason
never saw another case after awarding an age discrimination plaintiff$1.7 million, including
$700,000 in punitive damages).
109 See Paul Salvatore, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment Law: The Pros,
the Cons, and the How, IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION [ADR]: How TO USE IT TO
YOUR ADVANTAGE, at 537, 543 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, Dec. 15, 1994)
("[A]rbitrators are much more hesitant to impose punitive or emotional distress damages;
arbitrators who routinely grant such damages risk becoming unacceptable as 'neutral' third
parties.").
110 Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 527 (1992) (observing that labor
arbitration remedies usually are limited to orders of future compliance and compensation for
lost wages and benefits).
I I I See, MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION
436-38, 450-60 (2d ed. 1991).
112 See Maltby, supra note 46, at 46-48 (collecting studies).
113 Summers, supra note 110, at 465.
114Id.
115 Id. at 466.
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awards bore little resemblance to the plaintiffs' economic losses.1 16 He
concluded that the litigation system resulted in "a lottery in which many receive
nothing, most receive less than their economic loss; while a lucky few win the
jackpot." 117
Nevertheless, the fear of losing such a lottery might induce employers to
comply with the law. There is good reason, however, to think that this is not so.
Employer responses to the litigation lottery frequently take the form of"suit[ing]
up in 'legal armouiplate' to defend." 118 Employers "bulletproof their
workplaces," creating objective procedures that leave detailed paper trails
designed more to reduce liability exposure than ensure statutory compliance. 1
9
Although such tactics may actually mask discrimination, they feed an increasing
judicial appetite to grant summary judgmeni, 20 an appetite stimulated by
increasing judicial distrust ofjuries brought on, in part, by outlier jury awards.
Arbitration, on the other hand, eliminates the mofion for summary judgment.
By being faster and less expensive, arbitration may be a more accessible forum
for employees of modest means with modest 'claims.121 Although awards are
lower, the available evidence suggests that aggrieved employees obtain a
recovery much more frequently in arbitration systems providing fair procedures
than in litigation.' 22 More frequent employee recoveries may result in greater
employer compliance than occasional sensational'jury awards. As Professor
Summers has suggested, "Deterrence, is better achieved by increasing the
percentage of violators held liable than by increasing the penalty on a few
unlucky ones." 123
As discussed above, arbitrator-appointing agencies will play a key role in
policing employment arbitration to ensure that it does not become a tool for
employers to evade their obligations to comply with regulatory statutes. Although
most discussion of the repeat player imbalance has focused on its effect on
individual arbitrators, the imbalance can have a potentially greater effect on the
arbitrator-appointing agency. An employee's counsel will be involved in
1161Id.
117 Id
118 Id. at 469-70.
119 See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding
Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (1999);
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999).
120 See Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REv.
141 (2000).
121 See Corrada, supra note 48, at 1051-52, 1069.
122 See Maltby, supra note 46, at 45-51.
123 Summers, supra note I 10, at 536.
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selecting the individual arbitrator and can strike any arbitrator perceived as
favoring employers. However, the employer unilaterally selects the arbitrator-
appointing agency when it designs the arbitration system. An employer who
mandates arbitration under AAA Rules, for example, has unilaterally selected the
AAA as its arbitrator-appointing agency.
The enormous importance of the identity and impartiality of the arbitrator-
appointing agency is obvious. Therefore, it is surprising that it has received
almost no attention from the courts. On rare occasions when courts approach the
subject, they tend to defer to the credibility of established arbitration service
providers such as AAA 124 or the securities exchanges. For example, in
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,125 the First Circuit
reversed a district court holding that the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE)
arbitration system was structurally biased against employees. The district court
had based its conclusion on Merrill Lynch's membership in the NYSE and on
the NYSE's being governed by its member firms. The First Circuit, however,
found that the majority of NYSE board members were not securities industry
representatives and that NYSE regulations, including its arbitration procedures,
were subject to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The court
observed that "[r]ather than being controlled by the securities industry, the
NYSE plays a significant role in monitoring and disciplining exchange members
for non-compliance with its rules."'126 Furthermore, the court noted that, in
employment disputes, a majority of the arbitration panel could not come from the
industry and persons with industry links were prohibited from serving as public
arbitrators. The NYSE's rules also provided for disclosure of arbitrator
backgrounds, one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. The
court concluded that the NYSE arbitration procedures contained sufficient
safeguards against bias in the arbitration panel.
On the other hand, there has been judicial skepticism with respect to
newcomers. For example, in Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 127 the
Sixth Circuit, in dicta, questioned the neutrality of an arbitration forum in light
of the relationship between the employer and the arbitration services provider,
Employment Dispute Services, Inc. The court wrote the following:
124 For example, in union security fee cases, courts deferred to AAA's reputation for
integrity and approved procedures whereby AAA unilaterally selected the arbitrator. See,
e.g., Damiano v. Matish, 830 F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (6th Cir. 1987); Andrews v. Educ. Ass'n
of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987).
125 Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1999).
126 Id. at 15.
127 Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
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charges with the Board as a condition of employment.61 As such, the General
Counsel found that the agreement deterred employees from seeking to file
charges and thus constituted "an open attack on an employee's right to seek
access to the Board. ."."62 The General Counsel also noted that the NLRA
"gives the Board the authority to prevent or remedy unfair labor practices,
regardless of any other dispute resolution mechanisms that may be available. 63
Then, in an apparent attempt to reconcile its arguments with the Board's frequent
deferral to the grievance and arbitration procedures in the union setting, the
General Counsel concluded that such use of its discretionary authority would be
the "antithesis of the purpose of the Employer's attempt.., to preclude the
Board from exercising its jurisdiction in any manner." 64
Second, the General Counsel essentially argued that it was unclear under
Gilmer whether these agreements were enforceable in contracts of employment. 65
Third, the General Counsel found that, because a charge must be filed before
the Board can investigate, any arbitration agreement that might bar an employee
from filing an unfair labor practice charge necessarily interferes with the Board's
jurisdiction.66
Finally, the General Counsel concluded that the fact that the agreement at
issue stated that the employment relationship was "at will," and that no "just
cause" was required to terminate the employee, the agreement was "illusory"
because the employee did not have a basis upon which to claim the termination
was improper.67 Ultimately, the case was settled before a trial.68
61 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 212-13, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *5.
62 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *9.
63 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997. Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 214, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *13.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *13.
67 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCII) at 214, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *15.
68 In its opinion, the Division of Advice noted that the employer offered to settle the
matter (1) "by agreeing to send a memorandum to all current employees stating that the
arbitration agreement was not meant to prohibit access to the Board"; (2) by including a
clause within the agreement that it was not meant to prohibit access to the Board; (3) by
reinstating Letwin upon his signing of the amended agreement; (4) by paying back pay to
Letwin if Letwin was reinstated and (5) if the settlement included a nonadmission clause.
Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice Memorandum
Rep. (CCH) at 212, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. 0CM LEXIS, at *4; Accord Reached on
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B. Architectural Building Products, Inc.69
A couple of years after the Bentley's Luggage Corp. case settled, AD
Steven Charno held a trial and issued a bench decision holding that Architectural
Building Products, Inc. "violated [s]ections 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the NLRA by
implementing and maintaining a grievance and arbitration provision which
unlawfully restricts the right of its employees to use the Board's processes and
unlawfully conditioning the reinstatement of two employees on their acceptance
of the grievance and arbitration procedure."70 The ALJ reached this conclusion,
despite the fact that the language of the arbitration agreement stated that the
agreement was not "a waiver of any requirement of the employee to timely file
any charge with the NLRB" and the fact that the handbook contained a savings
clause that any provision in the policies that were "inconsistent with any statute,
regulation, law or precedent would be deemed to be inoperative and severable." 71
The judge based his decision on three aspects of the agreement: (1) that the
agreement was the "'exclusive method of resolution of all disputes;"' (2) that
employees must file any grievance within five days or lose their right to assert a
claim in any forum; and (3) that an employee who asserted his rights to file a
lawsuit or agency proceeding in violation of the agreement would be liable for
reasonable costs, expenses, attorneys' fees, and costs of litigation incurred by the
employer as a result of the employee's suit or proceeding if the employer secures
a stay or dismissal of the action.72 No exceptions were filed to this decision.
C. Exceptional Professional, Inc.73
Less than a month after the Architectural Building Products, Inc. decision
was issued, ALl Mary Miller Cracraft struck down a mandatory grievance and
arbitration clause contained in an employment application as violative of sections
8(a)(1) and (3), and sections 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA.74 Although the
Unfair Practice Case Involving Mandatory Arbitration Pledge, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
96, at A-11 (May 17, 1996) (discussing the settlement in which the employer was required
to rescind its mandatory policy and reinstate the terminated employee with back pay).
69 Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc., No. 17-CA-19326, 1998 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 541, at
*1 (July 28, 1998).
70 Id. at *4.
71 Id. at *6-7.
72 Id. at *8.
73 Exceptional Prof'l, Inc., Nos. 17-CA-19272, 17-CA-19325, 17-CA-19385, 1998
N.L.R.B. LEXIS 563, at *1 (Aug. 5, 1998).
74 Id. at *72.
[Vol. 16:3 2001]
ADR AND THE NLRA
In Spielberg, the parties agreed to arbitrate the employer's refusal to reinstate
four employees who had gone out on strike and who were accused of picket-line
misconduct.7 The arbitration was heard by a three-member panel, which was
selected pursuant to the terms set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. 8
The collective bargaining agreement also provided that the parties would be
bound by the decision of the panel majority. 9 After a hearing in which three of
the four strikers testified, a majority of the panel concluded that the employer did
not have to reinstate the four employees. 10 Following the arbitration, the four
individuals filed unfair labor practice charges, and the General Counsel issued
a complaint. I I The administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the employer's
affirmative defense that it could rely on the arbitration decisi6n to justify its
refusal to reinstate the strikers. He held that the employer violated the Act and
ordered that the employer reinstate the strikers. 12
On review of the employer's exceptions to the ALl's Intermediate Report,
the Board dismissed the complaint and found that the employer did not violate
the NLRA when, consistent with the arbitration award, it refused to reinstate the
four strikers. 13 In reaching this conclusion, the Board observed that all the parties
had acquiesced in the arbitration proceeding and agreed to be bound by the
decision, that the proceedings were fair and regular, and that the decision of the
panel was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.14 Given
the circumstances, the Board found that "the desirable objective of encouraging
the voluntary settlement of labor disputes [would] best be served by [its]
recognition of the arbitrators' award."15 These standards became known as "the
Spielberg deferral doctrine." The Board later modified the Spielberg doctrine in
Raytheon Co. by adding a requirement that the issues involved in the unfair labor
practice case must be presented to and considered by the arbitrator.16
Unfortunately, the vagrancies of this later modification resulted in an
inconsistent application of the doctrine.







14 Id. at 1086.
15 Id. at 1082.
16 Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886 (1963).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Almost twenty years later, in Olin Corp.,17 the Board finally clarified its
Raytheon Co. modification of the Spielberg doctrine. In Olin Corp., the Board
held that it would find that an arbitrator had "adequately considered the unfair
labor practice [if] the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, and if the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant
to resolving the unfair labor practice."' 8 The Board further noted that the
arbitrator's award does not need to be totally consistent with Board precedent. 19
Unless the award is "palpably wrong," which the Board defined as a "decision
that is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act," the Board will
defer to the arbitration award.20 The Board also placed the burden on the party
objecting to deferral to establish that the Spielberg standards were not met.21
B. Pre-Arbitration Deferral to Arbitration Procedure
Consistent with its policy of post-arbitration deferral, the Board, in 1971,
adopted specific criteria for pre-arbitral deferral to the parties'
grievance/arbitration procedures.
In the seminal case of Collyer Insulated Wire,22 the Board was faced with
a claim by the employer that the union's section 8(a)(5) charge alleging a refusal
to bargain and unilateral changes in the conditions of employment should be
deferred to the grievance and arbitrations procedures of the collective bargaining
agreement. A majority of the Board held that the Board should and would defer
to the existing grievance and arbitrations procedures of the collective bargaining
agreement.
The Board articulated several reasons to favor deferral to the parties'
grievance/arbitration procedures. These reasons included (1) that the dispute
arose within the "confines of a long and productive collective bargaining
relationship;" (2) that there was no claim of employer animosity to the
employee's exercise of protected rights; (3) that the parties contract provided for
arbitration of a very broad range of disputes; (4) that the arbitration clause clearly
17 Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).




22 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). Collyer Insulated Wire involved
allegations by the union that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5),29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1994), of the NLRA by failing to bargain with the union over changes in conditions of
employment. The employer contended that the charge should be deferred to the existing
grievance and arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining agreement.
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control discovery efficiently likely will frustrate counsel for both parties and not
see future work. On the other hand, arbitral control of the discovery process can
provide the flexibility to balance litigants' needs for information against
maintenance of the efficiency of the arbitral forum in a manner tailored to each
specific case. 142
Most importantly, providing for arbitral control of the discovery process on
a case-by-case basis precludes employers from using discovery limitations as a
means of contracting out of compliance with employment statutes. As long as the
arbitrator selection process assures arbitral neutrality, an employer cannot rely
in advance on discovery rulings that consistently will prevent employees from
establishing their claims. Thus, arbitral control over the discovery process should
preserve the incentives for employers to comply with employment statutes.
C. Limitations on Limitations and Limitations on Remedies
A common way in which employers have used mandatory arbitration as a
means of contracting out of statutory compliance has been to shorten the
limitations period for filing claims and to restrict the arbitrator's remedial
authority, thereby excluding certain statutory remedies. 143 Courts have responded
to such actions in four different ways.
One approach is to leave the validity of such limitations to the arbitrator to
resolve. In Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock,144 the Third Circuit
enforced an agreement to arbitrate even though the agreement shortened the
limitations period for filing a claim and restricted the remedies that the arbitrator
was authorized to award. The court opined that the validity of such waivers of
rights and remedies was an issue for the arbitrator to decide. 145
The Third Circuit's decision is an abdication ofjudicial authority that places
the arbitrator in an untenable position. The arbitrator is a creature of contract. If
the parties did not agree by contract to arbitrate, the arbitrator would have no
authority to act. Thus, the Third Circuit's decision leaves to the arbitrator a ruling
that the arbitrator may have no authority to make. The decision produces a result
that either undermines the statutory scheme at issue in the case or undermines the
contractual basis of the arbitration. It is hard to tell which is the lesser of these
two evils. Arbitrators should not be forced to make that choice.
More importantly, leaving the issue to the arbitrator does nothing to prevent
the use of mandatory arbitration as a means of avoiding statutory obligations.
142 For an example of such balancing, see Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, No. 92
C 5654, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18301 (N.D. 111. Dec. 9, 1996).
143 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
144 Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997).
145 Id at 231.
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Rational employers do not expect limitations on claim filing periods and
remedies ultimately to be enforced. Rather, they include such provisions to deter
claims from being brought in the first place. Employees who are bound to
arbitration agreements that on their face preclude compensatory or punitive
damages or attorney fees are less likely to pursue their claims. They will have to
discount their recoveries by the likelihood that the arbitrator will abide by the
remedy limitations. Moreover, such provisions are likely to deter plaintiffs'
counsel from taking such cases. Employers can rely on such limitations to reduce
their exposure substantially regardless of the merits of the underlying claims.
Leaving the issue to the arbitrator does little to reduce the employer's use of
mandatory arbitration to contract out of statutory compliance.
A second approach is to interpret the arbitration agreement around the
offending limitations. For example, in McCaskill v. SCI Management, Inc.,14 6
the court faced an arbitration agreement that provided that each party would bear
its own costs and attorney fees but that also adopted American Arbitration
Association rules. The court held the agreement enforceable because AAA rules
allowed the arbitrator to award costs and attorney fees and suggested that if the
arbitrator did not comply with the statute calling for fee shifting for prevailing
parties, a court could correct the mistake upon review of the award. 147
A third approach is related to the second. Rather than interpret around the
offending provision, the court simply severs it from the agreement, and enforces
the promise to arbitrate without the limitations on the arbitrator's authority.
These two approaches are preferable to leaving the decision to the arbitrator.
They remove any contractual barriers to the arbitrator's authority, thereby freeing
the arbitrator from an otherwise untenable position. However, they fail to remedy
the deterrent effect of the offending limitations in the first instance. Therefore,
they leave the mandatory arbitration agreement as an effective, albeit somewhat
weakened, method of employer contracting out of statutory obligations.
The fourth approach is to refuse to enforce the promise to arbitrate, at least
with respect to statutory claims. Several leading cases have adopted this
approach. In Brennan v. King,148 the First Circuit refused to require a university
faculty member, who claimed that his tenure denial was based on his HIV-
positive status and his sexual preference, to use the university's arbitration
procedure. The court based its decision in part on the procedure's limitation of
146 McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt., Inc., No. 00 C 1543, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10317 (N.D.
Il. June 19, 2000).
147 Judge Edwards used a similar process to interpret the arbitration agreement at issue
in Cole to not require the plaintiff to pay a portion of the arbitrator's fee. 105 F.3d at 1485-
86.
148 Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258 (Ist Cir. 1998).
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the arbitrator's authority to direct the provost to transmit an arbitral finding in
favor of the faculty member to the university president.
Similarly, in Armendariz,1 49 the arbitration agreement limited the arbitrator
to awarding back pay up to the date of the arbitration award and expressly
precluded reinstatement or injunctive relief. The court held that the limitation
was contrary to public policy and unenforceable.1 50 In Paladino v. Avnet
Computer Technologies, Inc.,151 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted an agreement
to arbitrate "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the
employee's] employment or termination of employment," that limited the
arbitrator to awarding "damages for breach of contract." 152 The court observed
that a limitation on remedies for a statutory claim would be invalid.
Consequently, it interpreted the agreement as one which obligated the employee
to arbitrate claims for breach of contract only.' 53
Decisions refusing to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements that contain
illegal limitations on arbitrators' authority recognize that such limitations taint
the entire arbitration agreement. Such limitations transform the arbitration
agreement into a contracting out of the duty to comply with employment statutes.
As such, the entire agreement is contrary to the policies embodied in the
employment statutes and the entire agreement should* be struck down. By
denying the employer its forum of choice, courts will ensure that the forum is not
abused and will ensure that employees have not agreed to "forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute," but only agreed to "submit to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than ajudicial forum." 154 ,
D. Allocating the Costs ofArbitration
In Cole, the D.C. Circuit held that an arbitration agreement may not require
the employee to pay any part of the arbitrator's fee., The court reasoned as
follows:
Arbitration will occur in this case only because it has been mandated by the
employer as a condition of employment. Absent this requirement, the employee
would be free to pursue his claims in court without having to pay for the
services of a judge. In such a circumstance-where arbitration has been
149 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 675, 682-83 (Cal.
2000).
150 Id. at 682-83.
151 Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (1Ith Cir. 1998).
152 Id at 1056.
153 Id at 1057-58.
154 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.20' 26 (1991).
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imposed by the employer and occurs only at the option of the employer-
arbitrators' fees should be borne solely by the employer.155
The court expressed concern that the prospect of having to pay steep arbitrator
fees could deter employees from pressing their claims and thereby render the
arbitral forum inadequate for the vindication of statutory claims.
In the aftermath of Cole two approaches developed. Several courts agreed
with the holding of Cole that the employer must pay the entire fee of the
arbitrator. 156 Courts refused to sever provisions requiring the employee to pay
half of the arbitrator's fee from the remainder of the agreement and instead
invalidated arbitration agreements that provided for fee splitting.157
Some courts, however, refused to find arbitrator fee splitting agreements per
se invalid. Instead, these courts opined that whether requirements that an
employee pay part of the arbitrator's fee deprive the employee of an effective
forum in which to vindicate the statutory claim should be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis and in light of the employee's ability to bear the costs.1 58
The Supreme Court considered arbitrator fees and related costs in Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph.159 Randolph had sued Green Tree for alleged
violations of the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate
contained in the parties' retail installment contract. The arbitration provision was
silent concerning responsibility for filing fees, arbitrator fees, and related
expenses. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agreement posed
an unacceptable risk that Randolph could be subject to steep arbitration costs
and, accordingly, undermined her ability to vindicate her statutory rights in the
arbitral forum. 160 The Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four, reversed.
The Court observed, "It may well be that the existence of large arbitration
costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her
155 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
156 See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999);
Paladino, 134 F.3d 1054; Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,
669 (Cal. 2000). In Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir.
2000), the court expressed "serious reservations" about an arbitration agreement that
required the employee generally to pay half of the arbitrator's fee, but ultimately held the
agreement unenforceable on other grounds.
157 Shankle, 163 F.3d 1230; Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669.
158 See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1833 (2000); McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt., Inc., No. 00 C 1543, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10317 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2000).
159 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000).
160 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121
S.Ct. 513 (2000).
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federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum." 161 However, the Court reasoned
that a party resisting arbitration on such grounds bears the burden of showing the
probability that she will have to bear expenses that effectively impede her access
to the arbitral forum. 162 The Court held that Randolph failed to meet that burden.
It characterized the risk that she would be subject to excessive costs and fees as
"too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement."'1 63
The Court's decision in Green Tree is unfortunate for two reasons. First, it
undermines the efficiency advantages one finds in arbitration. The Court's
decision forces consumers, and by analogy employees, faced with arbitration
agreements presented to them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to litigate the
likelihood that they may face excessive arbitration costs. The Court compounded
this problem because it refused to provide any guidance concerning the type of
showing of excessive costs that would bar enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate.I64 For example, may an employee facing an arbitration agreement that
is silent as to responsibility for costs and fees who writes the employer seeking
assurances against excessive costs rely on the employer's failure to respond to
satisfy his burden under Green Tree? If so, there is no rational reason for not
requiring the party who unilaterally drafted the arbitration agreement to place
those assurances in the agreement itself. If not, the Court has forced a party to
litigate merely to obtain information about the costs of the arbitral forum. The
Court has left the parties in a legal limbo which can only lead to their wasting
time and resources on otherwise unnecessary litigation.
The Court easily could have avoided this result. It could have placed on the
party drafting the arbitration agreement the burden to expressly provide that a
claimant will not be burdened by excessive fees and costs. For example, the
Court could have established a bright line rule that, to be enforceable, an
agreement to arbitrate must provide that claimants will not have to shoulder any
filing fees, arbitrator fees or similar costs that would exceed the filing fees and
related costs they would face in federal court. Such a ruling would have resulted
in the incorporation of such assurances in the boilerplate of arbitration
agreements and eliminate the issue entirely, thereby increasing the speed and
efficiency of the arbitral forum.
More importantly, the Court in Green Tree totally failed to consider the
systematic effects of the agreement's silence concerning the costs of arbitration.
The Court focused the issue narrowly on whether Randolph faced a forum in
161 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 522.
162Id.
163 Id.
164 "How detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking
arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss ....
Id. at 522-23.
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which excessive fees precluded her from vindicating her statutory rights. Such
a narrow focus enabled the Court to place on Randolph the burden of
demonstrating the forum's unsuitability. It also eliminated from consideration the
probability that the agreement's silence concerning costs would deter many other
potential claimants from pursuing their claims. Such deterrent effects, however,
would substantially reduce the lender's, in Green Tree, or an employer's
incentive to comply with the underlying statutes. Such deterrent effects convert
an agreement to arbitrate into a contracting out of statutory compliance. The
Court's failure to consider such systematic concerns potentially reaches beyond
the issue of cost allocation and is most distressing.
E. Mutuality in Arbitration
In Armendariz,165 the California Supreme Court held that an agreement
binding employees to arbitrate their claims but not requiring their employer to
arbitrate its claims was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The court
reasoned as follows:
Given the disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes,
it is unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior bargaining power to
impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept such
limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee, without at
least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on "business
realities."... If the arbitration system established by the employer is indeed
fair, then the employer as well as the employee should be willing to submit
claims to arbitration. Without reasonable justification for this lack of mutuality,
arbitration appears less as a forum for neutral dispute resolution and more as
a means of maximizing employer advantage. Arbitration was not intended for
this purpose. 166
The court cautioned, however, that its holding should not be interpreted in
an overly broad manner. It stated:
This is not to say that an arbitration clause must mandate the arbitration of
all claims between employer and employee in order to avoid invalidation on
grounds of unconscionability. Indeed, as the employer points out, the present
arbitration agreement does not require arbitration of all conceivable claims that
an employee might have against an employer, only wrongful termination
claims. But an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context lacks
basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but not the
165 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
166 Id. at 692.
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other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transactions or
occurrences .... The arbitration in this case lacks mutuality in this sense
because it requires the arbitration of employee-but not employer--claims
arising out of a wrongful termination. An employee terminated for stealing
trade secrets, for example, must arbitrate his or her wrongful termination claim
under the agreement while the employer has no corresponding obligation to
arbitrate its trade secrets claim against the employee.167
Other courts, however, have enforced employee promises to arbitrate their
claims despite the absence of a corresponding promise by the employer.168 These
courts analyze the issue as one of consideration, rather 'than one of
unconscionability. They reason that the employer's promise to be bound by the
arbitration procedure and the results of that procedure is sufficient consideration
for the employee's promise to use that procedure for the employee's claims.
The Armendariz court appears to have carried its policing beyond what is
necessary to ensure employer statutory compliance. An employer's insistence
that employees arbitrate their claims while retaining for itself the right to press
its claims in court does not per se indicate that the mandatory arbitration system
is being used to contract out of statutory compliance. The different forums can
be explained by the different nature of the claims each party is likely to press
against the other. Employee claims are likely to turn on the resolution of factual
disputes.169 Factual disputes are well-suited for resolution in arbitration.
Employer claims, on the other hand, are most likelyto involve covenants not to
compete and the ownership of intellectual property. These claims are more likely
to raise complex issues of law that are better suited for judicial resolution.
On the other hand, courts must insist that both employer and employee be
mandated to arbitrate the employee's claims. If such mutuality is lacking, the
agreement effectively becomes a means by which the employer can contract its
way out of complying with its statutory duties. The agreement which the D.C.
Circuit enforced in Cole illustrates how this is so.
The agreement in Cole placed the decision of whether the employee's claim
would be litigated in court or arbitrated exclusively in the hands of the employer.
Under the agreement, if the employee brought suit, the employee waived his
right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the employer had the right, within sixty days
following service of the complaint, to require all or part of the claim to be
167 Id. at 694.
168 See, e.g., Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 1999);
Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 1998); O'Neil v. Hilton Head
Hosp., 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997).
169 See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Sen's., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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arbitrated under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. 170
Nevertheless, the court enforced the agreement.
Arbitration furthers statutory compliance by trading off the potential for
outlier jury awards for the likelihood of recoveries by a larger number of
claimants due to the speed, efficiency and consequent enhanced accessibility of
the arbitral forum. The agreement in Cole enabled the employer to thwart both
parts of the trade-off. An employer facing a claim with particularly egregious
facts that raised a realistic possibility of an outlier jury award could force the
claim into arbitration where the outlier award would be highly unlikely. On the
other hand, when the employer faced claims of much less monetary value, it
could insist on litigation, greatly reducing the likelihood that the claims would
be brought or that the employees would recover. Agreements like the one in Cole
allow the employer to manipulate the choice of forum in such a way as to
contract out of statutory compliance. They should not be enforced.
IV. ARBITRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
In Gilmer, the Court rejected Gilmer's claim that compelling arbitration
would undermine the EEOC's role in ADEA enforcement, observing that
arbitration agreements did not preclude parties from filing charges with the
EEOC and did not preclude the EEOC from taking action against
discrimination. 171 However, lower courts have divided over whether an
employee's agreement to arbitrate may have any effect on an enforcement action
by the EEOC.
The Second and Fourth Circuits have held that the EEOC may not seek
monetary relief on behalf of an employee who has entered a pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate claims under statutes that the EEOC enforces. 172 These
courts recognize that the employee's agreement to arbitrate cannot bind the
EEOC. Therefore, they hold that the EEOC remains free to pursue injunctive
relief.
However, these courts distinguish between the employee's personal interest
in obtaining monetary relief and the public interest represented by the EEOC.
They reason that the public interest will be protected if the EEOC is allowed to
pursue injunctive relief. On the other hand, in these courts' view, the federal
interest favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements should be protected by
limiting the employee's personal claim for monetary relief to the arbitral forum.
170 Id. at 1469.
171 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
172 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
1401 (2001); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
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The Second and Fourth Circuits find support for their approach in decisions
that preclude the EEOC from seeking monetary relief for individual employees
who have already settled their claims or who have litigated their claims and lost.
In such circumstances, the EEOC is allowed to pursue injunctive relief only.
These courts regard the balance struck in the settlement and prior litigation cases
as comparable to the balance that must be struck in determining what relief the
EEOC may pursue in the face of an employee agreement to arbitrate.
The Sixth Circuit has rejected this approach and has held that the EEOC
may pursue all relief regardless of whether an employee has promised to
arbitrate. 173 The court has reasoned that the EEOC's cause of action is separate
from the employee's cause of action. It has regarded the private arbitration
agreement as incapable of binding the federal sovereign agency in any manner.
It has noted that the EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction over a charge and the
exclusive right to file suit during the first 180 days after the charge is filed. It has
distinguished cases that preclude the EEOC from seeking monetary relief for
individuals who have litigated and lost as cases involving application of the
doctrine of claims preclusion. In the view of the Sixth Circuit, such cases have
no application to cases where the EEOC seeks to litigate claims involving
employees who had agreed to arbitrate because those claims have yet to be
decided or otherwise resolved.
Our systematic approach to the Gilmer fallout enables us to resolve this
conflict among the circuits. In the absence of an agreement for mandatory
arbitration, employers are subject to suit by the EEOC for a full range of
remedies, including monetary relief for individual employees. An individual
employee's settlement of a claim against the employer precludes the EEOC from
seeking monetary relief for that employee. The settlement however, occurs after
the fact of the employer's conduct that prompted the claim. At the time the
employer acted, it was subject to the possibility of EEOC action seeking full
relief.
In contrast, where mandatory arbitration precludes the EEOC from seeking
monetary relief for individual employees, it operates ex ante.. The employer
knows from day one that its actions cannot be subject to EEOC claims seeking
full relief. The employer has contracted out from under a major feature of the
statutory scheme. Although the EEOC is able to litigate a tiny fraction of the
claims brought to its attention, it is most likely to litigate on behalf of individual
employees in cases that are particularly egregious or cases that are likely to make
new law. Employers who contract out from EEOC actions for individual relief
are contracting out from a significant part of their statutory obligations.
Consequently, mandatory arbitration agreements should not preclude the EEOC
173 EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Frank's
Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
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or other enforcement agencies from litigating on behalf of individual employees
or from recovering monetary relief for those employees.
V. JUDICAL REVIEW AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
The Federal Arbitration Act provides the following bases for a court to
vacate an arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made. 174
In Gilmer, the Court appeared to acknowledge that the grounds provided for
vacating awards in the FAA are not exclusive. The Court wrote, "[A]Ithough
judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is
sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute
at issue." 175 On two occasions, the Court has indicated in dicta that arbitration
awards are subject to review for manifest disregard for the law. 176
Most courts that have applied the manifest disregard for the law standard in
employment arbitrations have considered it a very narrow standard of review.
They have held that for there to be manifest disregard for the law, the governing
legal principle must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to-the case,
and the arbitrator must have known of the principle and consciously refused to
apply it. 177
174 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
175 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
176 First Options of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
177 See, e.g., Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000);
Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2000); DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997).
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The Fifth Circuit has adopted a standard that is even narrower. In Williams
v. CIGNA Financial Advisors, Inc., 178 the, court opined that to vacate an
arbitration award, there must be a finding that the arbitrator acted contrary to the
law and that enforcement of the award "would 'result in significant injustice,
taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including powers of
arbitrators to judge norms appropriate to the relations between the parties."' 179
Under the majority narrow view of what constitutes manifest disregard for
the law, the party seeking to vacate an arbitration award has an extremely heavy
burden. Just how heavy is illustrated by DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.180 DiRussa arbitrated a claim against Dean Witter and its regional director
in which he contended that his demotion from branch manager to account
executive was based on his age in violation'of the ADEA and the New Jersey
Law Against' Discrimination. The arbitiation panel awarded him $200,000
against both defendants and an additional $20,000 against the regional director,
but denied DiRussa, inter alia, attorney fees. The Second Circuit refused to
vacate the arbitrators' denial of attorney fees.
The court recognized that the ADEA mandates an award of attorney fees to
a prevailing ADEA plaintiff. It characterized the ADEA's mandate as well
defined,/explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.181 Nevertheless, the court
refused to overturn the award because it could find "no persuasive evidence that
the arbitrators actually knew of-and intentionally disregarded-the mandatory
aspect of the ADEA's fee provision."'182 The court considered itself unable to say
that the arbitrators knew of the ADEA's attorney fees mandate because DiRussa
had failed to point it out clearly in his submissions to them. 183 In essence, the
court held that the parties to a statutory employment arbitration are not entitled
to assume that their arbitrator knows the basics of the statute under which they
are arbitrating.
Judge Edwards has criticized the Second Circuit's approach severely. He has
characterized the court's refusal to overturn the denial of attorney fees as
hard to fathom. Everyone except the arbitrators understood and agreed that
DiRussa was legally entitled to attorney's fees; to allow the arbitrators'
ignorance or error to deny DiRussa a requested remedy that has been mandated
178 Williams v. CIGNA Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999).
179 Id. at 762.
180 DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 818.
181 Id. at 822.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 823.
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by Congress is to allow arbitration to undermine the statutory scheme designed
to protect victims of discrimination. 184
The ability to establish a manifest disregard for the law is complicated
further by the frequent arbitral practice of not explaining the rationale for an
award. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, "Arbitrators are not required to explain
their decisions. If they choose not to do so, it is all but impossible to determine
whether they acted with manifest disregard for the law." 185 Similarly, a district
court has opined that where the arbitrator has not explained the rationale for the
award, a court must enforce it as long as even a colorable justification can be
inferred from the underlying facts. 186
This does not mean that it is impossible to vacate an arbitrator's award under
the narrow interpretation of manifest disregard for the law. Successful petitions
to vacate, however, are very rare.
One such successful petition to vacate occurred in Montes v. Shearson
Lehman Brothers.187 Montes had claimed that Shearson had failed to pay her
overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Shearson maintained that
Montes was exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions. The arbitrators issued
an award for Shearson. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the evidence which
tended to establish that Montes was not exempt. It also reviewed Shearson's
counsel's closing argument to the arbitrators in which he urged them to disregard
the law. The court concluded that on the record before it, Montes had established
that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law because the evidence in
support of the award was marginal at best and because defense counsel had
expressly urged the panel not to apply the relevant law.
The Second Circuit similarly found manifest disregard for the law in
Halligan v. Piper Jaffiay, Inc. 188 In that case, the court held that the combination
of the absence of a written rationale for the award and the presence of
overwhelming evidence of age discrimination supported the conclusion that the
arbitrators ignored the law or the facts or both. The court vacated the award.
A broader approach to judicial review has emerged from the D.C. Circuit.
In Cole v. Burns International Security Services,189 the court opined that the
manifest disregard for the law standard must be interpreted in light of the bases
184 Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 293, 305 (1999).
185 Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000).
186 Ahing v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 94CIV.9027(CSH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5175
at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000).
187 Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
188 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
189 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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for Gilmer's endorsement of arbitration of statutory claims. The court focused
on the Supreme Court's statement that a party does not forgo statutory rights by
agreeing to arbitrate, but only submits to their resolution in an arbitral forum, and
its statement that judicial review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply
with the statute at issue. The court concluded that the typical arbitration which
turns on factual findings will be affirmed by the courts, but added, "[T]here will
be some cases in which novel or difficult legal issues are presented demanding
judicial judgment. In such cases, the courts are empowered to review an
arbitrator's award to ensure that its resolution of public law issues is correct." 190
Thus, the court appeared to endorse a standard of de novo judicial review of
arbitral interpretations of the statute.
If courts do not review employment arbitration awards for errors of law, we
risk transforming a system of public law into a system of private justice whereby
the same statutes and leading precedents mean one thing to employees of Merril
Lynch and another to employees of Circuit City. At least with large employers,
the impact of such private justice systems will be very far reaching. As Professor
Corrada has observed, "[A] private justice system implemented by General
Motors or Exxon will typically yield a 'shared understanding' of employment
law that is more widely held than that yielded by a local trial court decision from
Basalt, Colorado."191 In a prior article, Professor Ladenson and I have
demonstrated why such a system of private law is intolerable. 192 Federal
employment statutes represent a congressional reaction to perceived market
failures by mandating uniform minimum labor standards. They guard against
competitive pressures driving labor standards down below levels that public
policy would tolerate. For example, in the absence of employment discrimination
statutes, employers who disregard customer preferences for members of a
particular race, gender, ethnic background, or age group will be at a competitive
disadvantage to employers who pander to such base instincts. Private arbitration
systems that produce awards whose legal conclusions are not subject to judicial
review undermines the uniformity that is a foundation of statutory policy. "Bona
fide occupational qualification" may not mean one thing at General Motors and
another at Ford. 193
Furthermore, because arbitrators exist outside the hierarchical public justice
system that is characterized by review at successively higher levels of courts with
further review of legal interpretations by the legislature, the scope of their
legitimate authority is narrower than that enjoyed by judges who operate within
190 Id. at 1487.
191 Corrada, supra note 48, at 1060.
192 Malin & Ladenson, supra note 83, at 1226-38.
193 See id at 1226-29.
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the public justice system. Arbitrators must confine their interpretations of legal
rules to those falling within the core of settled meaning whenever possible. When
not possible, arbitrators still must be guided by a philosophy ofjudicial caution,
interpreting established legal rules in "relatively familiar and unsurprising
ways." 194 Judges and other publicly accountable officials, on the other hand,
because they operate within the hierarchy of the public justice system, have the
legitimate authority to interpret legal rules to develop the legal system to be the
best in can be.
Leaving development of statutory employment law to private tribunals
evolving private understandings at particular employers amounts to a basic
contracting out from the employer's obligation to comply with its statutory
duties. De novo judicial review of arbitral interpretations of law is necessary to
bring those interpretations within the hierarchical public justice system and
ensure that arbitration does not result in contracting out of statutory compliance.
Professor Covington, however, in a thoughtful commentary on our analysis
suggests that we gave insufficient weight to concerns for finality in arbitration. 195
He analogizes to other doctrines that enhance finality, such as resjudicata and
the law of the case. 196 He observes that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Constitution, a court in one jurisdiction may not review the merits of a
judgment rendered by another jurisdiction. 197 He cautions that the delay
occasioned by the absence of finality usually will benefit the party who has the
greater resources, i.e., the employer in most cases. He states that "[e]ach time a
new doctrine providing for review is created, a worker whose debatable claim
has won out in arbitration is likely to see the day when she gets money put
further and further off, as briefs are filed and arguments heard, and appeals taken
to the next higher court." 198
With all due respect to Professor Covington, I submit that his analogy to
doctrines precluding one jurisdiction from inquiring into the merits ofjudgments
of other jurisdictions is flawed. A court in Illinois asked to enforce the judgment
of a court in New York is presented a result from a publicly accountable tribunal
operating within the hierarchical public justice system. A private arbitrator who
operates outside of the hierarchical public justice system enjoys a much narrower
scope of legitimate interpretive authority than does a judge. In the prior article,
we argued that this distinction is crucial.
19 4 Id. at 1233.
195 Covington, supra note 8, at 404.
19 6 Id. at 406-07.
197 Id. at 406.
198 Id. at 407.
[Vol. 16:3 20011
PRIVATIZING JUSTICE-BUT BY HOW MUCH?
Professor Covington's concerns with finality of the arbitration process are
substantial. In the prior article we argued that de novo review of employment
arbitrators' interpretations of the law will not undermine finality in the typical
case where the dispute is wholly factual. 199, The court agreed in Cole.200
Professor Covington, however, cautions that the distinction between factual
findings and legal error will be sufficiently slippery so as to enable parties intent
on delay to raise sufficiently plausible legal arguments that will challenge the
award.201
The Canadian experience provides us some comfort against Professor
Covington's concerns. Canadian labor arbitrators are required to consider public
law in resolving grievances, and their awards are held to a standard of legal
correctness in subsequent judicial review.202 Nevertheless, there is no evidence
that this has undermined the finality of Canadian labor arbitration awards.
. Of course, we should never underestimate the ingenuity of American lawyers
to turn rulings on factual disputes into alleged errors of law. Accordingly, courts
will have to be ready to police against such abuses. Aggressive use of sanctions
against parties who, in the guise of a petition to vacate, seek to relitigate
essentially factual findings should curb these abuses.203
Thus, we can conclude that the D.C. Circuit got it right in Cole. The Second
Circuit, however, got it wrong in both DiRussa and Halligan. The Second
Circuit's errors threaten to undermine the ability of employment arbitration to
provide an accessible forum that furthers the enforcement of employment
statutes.
In DiRussa, the arbitrators' conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to
attorney fees was patently wrong.204 Nevertheless, the court refused to vacate the
award because the record did not reveal that the parties educated the arbitrators
about the controlling law.205 The court's decision reduces the efficiency of the
199 Malin & Ladenson, supra note 83, at 1230.
200 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
201 Covington, supra note 8, at 408.
2 02 See Randi Hammer Abramsky & Martin H. Malin, Cross Border Perspectives on
the Use of Eternal Law in Labor Arbitration, in SEEKiNG COMMON GROUND: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 21 sT ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DIsPuTE
RESOLUTION 199 (James B. Boskey et al. eds., 1994).
203 See Mark Berger, Judicial Review ofLabor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies
and Sanctions, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245 (1992) (making a similar point concerning the use
of sanctions to curb abuses of thejudicial process that would undermine the finality of labor
arbitration awards).
204 Even the National Labor Relations Board, which employs a policy of broad-based
deferral of unfair labor practice charges to labor arbitration would not defer to such an
erroneous ruling. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
205 DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1997).
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arbitral forum. No longer may parties simply present their facts and argue their
cases to the arbitrators and assume that the arbitrators understand the law. They
now must further complicate the proceedings and endure the added of expense
of educating the arbitrators on the law. The need for detailed briefs becomes
manifest and the procedure more cumbersome.
The Second Circuit compounded its error in Halligan. Although the court
characterized the award as displaying manifest disregard for the law or the facts
or both, its decision to vacate the award was prompted by its review of the record
and its conclusion that the evidence of discrimination was overwhelming. In
other words, the court vacated the award because it disagreed with the
arbitrators' factual findings. By so doing, the court undermined the finality it
sought to preserve in DiRussa. It also undermined the efficiency advantages of
arbitration that can protect employees as well as employers. The Halligan
decision appears to invite employers to challenge awards in cases they lose on
the ground that the evidence against the plaintiffs was overwhelming. In labor
arbitration, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of deferral to the
arbitrator's factual findings to ensuring finality in the process. The Court has
stated that "improvident, even silly fact-finding" by the arbitrator is not a basis
for vacating an arbitration award. 206 Instead, the Court has held that courts must
defer to the facts as found by the agent appointed by the parties for that
purpose.207
There is no justification for a different approach in arbitration of statutory
employment claims. Improvident or silly fact-finding is most probably the result
of a loose cannon arbitrator's ignorance or a partisan arbitrator's bias. Neither is
likely to enable an employer to use mandatory arbitration as a vehicle for
contracting out of statutory compliance.
The fire from a loose cannon can hit either party without warning. An
employer who wins before a loose cannon arbitrator cannot rely on winning
before the same arbitrator in the future. A victory before a loose cannon is a
matter of luck. It provides the employer with no systematic advantage that will
allow it to avoid future compliance with employment statutes. Market forces,
moreover, will take care of the loose cannon. Neither party who experiences a
loose cannon is likely to return to that arbitrator in the future regardless of
whether the party won or lost.
Where a partisan arbitrator is overtly biased, a court can vacate the award for
evident partiality. 20 8 Where partiality is covert, such as where an arbitrator leans
toward the employer, if safeguards dealing with the repeat player imbalance are
206 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987).
207 Id.
208 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
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in place, the employer cannot count on benefitting from that arbitrator's biases
in the future. Plaintiffs' lawyers will have learned their lesson with such an
arbitrator in the first case and are likely to strike the arbitrator in the future.
Certainly an employer who disregards its statutory obligations on the assumption
that a partial arbitrator will bail it out again does so at its peril.
Thus, courts should not intervene to correct what they perceive to be even
gross errors in arbitral fact finding. Doing so will undermine the finality of
arbitration awards which, in turn, will impede the efficiency and accessibility of
the arbitral forum. However, courts should police arbitration awards for errors
of law. Failure to do so can lead to the use of mandatory arbitration systems as
vehicles for contracting out of statutory obligations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's broad endorsement in Gilmer of the arbitration of
statutory employment claims has generated considerable fallout with which lower
courts have had to deal. The controversy surrounding Gilmer has been limited
to mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, even though many of the
criticisms of Gilmer apply to voluntary post-dispute arbitration agreements as
well. The crucial distinction between mandatory and voluntary arbitration is that
only the former carries a danger that employers will use it to contract out of their
statutory obligations. Accordingly, courts should police mandatory employment
arbitration systems to ensure that they do not serve as vehicles that relieve
employers of the need to comply with employment statutes.
In policing mandatory arbitration systems courts should insist on certain
basic due process safeguards. These safeguards include measures that will
correct the repeat player imbalance in employment arbitration. Courts may safely
leave discovery issues to case-by-case arbitral determination, but they should not
leave to arbitral determination the validity of agreement limitations on filing
periods or remedies or the allocations of the costs of the proceeding including the
arbitrator's fee. Rather, courts should refuse to enforce mandatory arbitration
agreements that limit statutory limitations periods or statutory remedies and
should refuse to enforce arbitration agreements that impose part of the costs of
the proceeding, such as the arbitrator's fee, on the plaintiff employee. Courts
need not require that employers who impose arbitration on employee claims also
submit their claims to arbitration. However, they should require that employers
be equally bound to arbitrate their employees' claims.
To protect mandatory arbitration systems from becoming vehicles by which
employers can evade their statutory duties, courts should hold that such systems
do not limit the relief that the EEOC and other government enforcement agencies
can recover. Courts should review arbitral legal interpretations de novo, but defer
completely to arbitral fact finding.

